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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Init ial Impr es s ions R epor t
AP
P
L
May 2004
No. 04-13
S t abi l i t y O per at i on s – S u ppor t O per at i on s
Cen t er f or A r my L es s on s L ear n ed
For t Leavenwor t h, Kansas 66027-1350
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
This information was deemed of immediate value to forces engaged in the Global War on
Terrorism and should not be necessarily construed as approved Army policy or doctrine.
This information is furnished with the understanding that it is to be used for defense purposes
only; that it is to be afforded essentially the same degree of security protection as such
information is afforded by the United States; that it is not to be revealed to another country or
internal organization without the written consent of the Center for Army lessons Learned.
If your unit has identified lessons learned or tactics, techniques, and procedures, please share
them with the rest of the Army by contacting CALL:
Telephone: DSN 5524387; Commercial (913) 6843035 or 2255
Fax: DSN 5524387; Commercial (913) 6844387
Email Address: callrfi@leavenworth.army.mil
When contacting us, please include your phone number and complete address.
For Official Use Only
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Executive Summary
ii
Chapter 1: Information Operations
Summary
1
Topic A: IO Synchronization Methods of Units
4
Topic B: Information Operations and Intelligence
7
Topic C: Public Affairs and the Media
10
Topic D: Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)
14
Topic E: IO at the Division
17
Topic F: IO at the Brigade and Below
22
Chapter 2: Civil Military Operations – Civil Affairs
Summary
29
Topic B: Transitioning to Civil Administration
36
Topic C: Cultural Issues in Iraq
39
Topic D: MTOE Issues
44
Chapter 3: Engineer
47
Topic A: Mobility, CounterMobility, and Survivability
48
Topic B: Combat Engineer Operations
51
Topic C: EOD, UXO, Captured Enemy Ammunition Mission
55
Topic D: Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
Contracts and Construction
Topic E: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
59
Chapter 4: Combat Service Support
Summary
65
Topic A: Supply the Force
67
Topic B: Maintain the Force
76
Topic C: Sustain the Force
83
Topic D: CSS C3I
88
Topic E: CSS STAMIS
95
Topic F: Health Service Support
101
Appendix A – Table of Supporting Observations
A1
For Official Use Only
i
Topic A: Integration of the Task Force CMO Effort
30
Summary
61
Appendix B – VTC Briefing
B1
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Three times as many U.S. Soldiers were killed since the end of hostilities in May 2003 as were
killed during combat operations. Combat operations and force protection operations remain as
relevant and critical during Phase IV as during Phases IIII.
A multitude of challenges face Army forces presently in and out of theater. Our models of how
to man, equip, and train the force for offensive operations do not link up across the board when
dealing with stability (and support) operations. Our current doctrine deals with a linear
battlefield and unified phases of operation. Our Soldier skill sets are focused on the primary
mission; conversely, onthejob training is being used today in theater to prepare Soldiers to plan
and execute missions that were looked at before as secondary or tertiary.
Great advances are being made in understanding cultural issues at local levels. Battalion and
companygrade officers are challenged to understand and manage issues dealing with the Iraqi
people with little or no training to support their decisions. A highlight to the tenacity of these
Soldiers is their ability to overcome a lack of training in understanding to execute political and
strategic objectives.
Current Iraqi sentiment has evolved from personal relationships between Coalition Soldiers and
Iraqi citizens. Because these relationships differ from location to location and person to person,
it is hard to correlate events and actions with relationship successes or failures. An armor task
force commander in Baghdad described his methodology as that of plotting and measuring
everything: “After a positive or negative event, he would have his staff evaluate all actions they
had conducted before, during, and after the event. This would allow him to correlate activities
with outcomes and develop TTP (tactics, techniques, and procedures) for future success.” While
not all actions provided equal measures or correlating events, this methodological approach
helped establish a base line of comparative success for his task force. It allowed him to utilize
the Army approach of BDA (battle damage assessment) in regard to stabilization and support
operations. This task force was very in tune with the local Iraqi populace in their area of
operation. A bond was built and cultivated over many months resulting in a trust between the
military and civilian population. As a result of this established relationship, a new anxiety has
developed due to the impending transfer of authority (TOA). The local leaders inquired about
the replacement force and their capability to “be as good” as the current command. The
incumbent task force felt it imperative to prebuild success in established events so that the new
command could capitalize on their past positive efforts. Obviously all of the effort and work to
continue positive momentum would be conducted by the current command. The local
population would see the new command arrive and continue to demonstrate success from the
start due to the seamless transfer of authority. This is an example of a positive exchange and
establishes a template for future relief in place (RIP) operations that guarantees support from the
local community.
While thankful for the removal of the former regime elements (FRE), to include Saddam
Hussein, the local populace has a short memory of their past lives. They tend to be focused on
the current issues and have a reasonable need for communication. Language barriers pose a
difficult task for all levels in this effort. A missed intent in local negotiations can mean future
significant problems in dealing with other issues. A poor communication effort may alienate a
local company commander and cause significant problems in future community negotiations. It
is imperative that communications be clear and effective and that all concerned are aware of its
implications.
In the Iraqi Operational Environment (IOE), success in civil administration requires an
understanding of Iraqi religious and tribal institutions and their relationship with the secular
ii
For Official Use Only
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR)
forms of government inherent to democracy and proposed by the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA). Furthermore, U.S. plans and practices cannot be successful in the absence of a
knowledge and understanding of Iraqi sentiments and perceptions. This is all the more important
given the high turnover of CPA personnel and the lack of regional expertise held by the majority
of Coalition military and civilians in Iraq. Although nominally running Iraq, maneuver
commanders are generally not trained in the complexities and subtleties of the area. This has
resulted in some U.S. practices serving to alienate common Iraqis who initially supported the
Coalition. To partially rectify this, some OIF units have sent division and brigade commanders
and staff to Jordan to receive instruction on how to operate effectively in Arab/Muslim Iraq.
Despite the excellent work done by numerous Soldiers to make parts of the information
operations (IO) campaign work effectively, Phase IV IO is executed sporadically in OIF. A
vertically integrated, horizontally synchronized IO campaign simply does not appear to exist.
Some U.S. units understand and use the concepts of setting objectives, developing themes, and
setting measures of effectiveness (MOE). Others do not understand the process and therefore are
just conducting operations without any measure of success or failure. Some commanders use
tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) teams (TPTs) as a reactive measure when negative
second or third order effects occur. Most IO battle drills are reactionary in nature.
U.S. commanders grapple with the concept of information operations across the range of military
operations. While some affirm that this is an IO fight and that it should be the priority for
Coalition efforts, others believe that IO is not an option, but that offensive operations should be
the main effort of this stability operations phase.
IO doctrine does not meet the needs of commanders in an operational environment for a variety
of reasons discussed in the IO chapter. IO does not seem to be integrated into the Army’s Officer
Education System (OES), Warrant Officer Education System (WOES), or NonCommissioned
Officer Education System (NCOES) on a consistent or standardized basis. Furthermore, IO does
not appear to be incorporated into most collective training events, either as a doctrinal
component of collective training or as a component of training assessment.
Soldiers are performing functions vastly different from those on which they have trained; this
continues to be a challenge. This is prevalent with almost every MOS in the theater. All
Soldiers are being asked to perform infantry missions/operations for which they have received
very little training. They have had to learn through an onthejob training program that has little
room for forgiveness, but it has become their dominant routine. The challenge to hone their
skills for successful mission accomplishment has been formidable. The performance of combat
engineers is a perfect example. They are continuing to conduct their primary missions of
mobility, countermobility, and survivability but now include direct infantry tactics required by
operations such as cordon and search and move to contact. Route clearance, improvised
explosive device (IED) detection, elimination of captured ammunition, and unexploded ordnance
disposal have also become primary missions. The shortage of trained explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) personnel and EOD detachments has made the engineers a force multiplier in
this area of operations. Engineers in one brigade combat team (BCT) have detonated over 80,000
tons of unexploded ordnance (UXO). Their vertical and horizontal skills are being employed to
satisfy requirements in support of combat operations and host nation building. Remarkable
performances are being realized throughout theater. Negotiation skills and management of funds
now become a requirement at the company command and higher levels. Young commanders are
contracting for construction and materials and beginning projects that will assist in future
community relations. These types of skills are not trained in the traditional officer and
noncommissioned officer school systems. Onthejob training has become the norm. The only
hesitancy relates to the personal desire to accomplish the process “right.” A young company
commander described his experience in acquiring materials for road and bridge construction.
Because the local population knew that culvert pipe was required for the project, the price
escalated. Upon questioning the vendor, it became apparent that local family needs, combined
For Official Use Only
iii
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