us-oif-3id-aar-2003, Wikileaks, Compleat Wikileaks Archive, Misc [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
For Official Use Only
Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
Table of Contents
Chapter 1
Continuous Offensive Operations Over Extended
Distances
1
Chapter 2
Full Spectrum Operations
11
Chapter 3
Mechanized Operations in Military Operations on Urban
Terrain (MOUT)
21
Chapter 4
Fire Support in Offensive Operations
29
Chapter 5
Helicopter Operations in the Offense
35
Chapter 6
Embedded Media
41
Chapter 7
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
(RSOI) and Army Prepositioned Stock (APS)
45
Chapter 8
Force Modernization/Modification Table of Organization
and Equipment (MTOE)
51
Chapter 9
Intelligence
63
Chapter
10
Maneuver
83
Chapter
11
Battle Staff Planning
93
Chapter 12
Fire Support
99
Chapter 13
Aviation Operations
131
Chapter 14
Close Air Support (CAS)
137
Chapter 15
Engineer
143
Chapter 16
Air Defense
169
Chapter 17
Communications
183
Chapter 18
Logistics
197
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Use Only
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Chapter 19
Personnel Service Support (PSS)
213
Chapter 20
Combat Health Support (CHS)
221
Chapter 21
Equal Opportunity (EO)
231
Chapter 22
Unit Ministry Team (UMT)
235
Chapter 23
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)
239
Chapter 24
Provost Marshal (PM)
251
Chapter 25
Army Airspace Command and Control (A
2
C
2
)
259
Chapter 26
Command and Control (C
2
)
265
Chapter 27
Information Operations (IO)
269
Chapter 28
Civil Affairs (CA)
271
Chapter 29
Marne Visitors Bureau (MVB)
275
Chapter 30
Inspector General (IG)
279
Chapter 31
Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)
281
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For Official Use Only
For Official Use Only
Chapter 1
Continuous Offensive Operations Over Extended Distances
Chapter Contents
Introduction
Topic A Training for Combat
Topic B Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and Intelligence (C
4
I)
Topic C Task Organization
Topic D Battlespace Management
Topic E Logistics
Introduction
Operating considerably beyond existing doctrine, the Third Infantry Division
(Mechanized) (3ID [M]) proved that a lethal, flexible, and disciplined mechanized force
could conduct continuous offensive operations over extended distances for twentyone
days. At its largest point, the division owned and influenced a 16,100 square kilometer
(km) battlespace (230 km deep and 70 km wide). The division’s training, utilization of
command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C
4
I), consideration and
implementation of its task organization, adherence to battlespace management, and
logistics all provided invaluable lessons for the force. The lessons learned about
offensive operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) will enable the Army to
grow and further develop its existing capabilities.
Chapter 1
Continuous Offensive Operations Over Extended Distances
Topic A - Training for Combat
The roots of the division’s successful attack to Baghdad are found on the training fields
of Fort Stewart, Fort Irwin, and Kuwait. The division crossed the line of departure with a
mature and trained group of staff officers, commanders, and soldiers. The ability of the
division to stabilize company commanders and field grade officers after conducting
multiple CONUS contingency response force (CCRF) and National Training Center
(NTC) rotations produced a seasoned fighting force that was trained and ready to fight
and win on any battlefield.
A direct correlation can be drawn between the division’s training cycle prior to crossing
the line of departure and the division’s successful attack into Iraq. The division
conducted multiple integrated live fire maneuver operations on urban terrain and
detailed command and control exercises at the task force through the division level to
prepare for combat.
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All maneuver battalions conducted externally evaluated forceonforce and live fire
training events focused on offensive operations at the company team level through the
battalion task force level. Every rifle squad conducted combined arms training focused
on entering and clearing a complex trench system and a multiple room structure. These
training events focused every maneuver unit in the division on the exact missions
soldiers would execute weeks later against the Iraqi Regular Army and Fedayeen death
squads.
The division artillery conducted live fire training events prior to crossing the line of
departure that massed every firing system in the division at a single point and ensured
every firing battery was trained and ready to mass fires anywhere on the modern day
battlefield.
The 4th Brigade (BDE) trained both close combat attacks in support of the ground
maneuver commander and shaping operations under the brigade commander’s control
while in Kuwait. This served to not only synchronize the brigade’s internal aviation
assets, but to also synchronize the division’s aviation assets with the ground maneuver
forces. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) established between 4th BDE
and the maneuver brigades facilitated the rapid and safe employment of attack aviation
in combat.
The division fought to train under realistic conditions in preparation for combat. The
priorities were clear and subordinate leaders executed training that produced a
disciplined, lethal, and flexible force capable of accomplishing any tactical task.
The requirement for tough realistic training has not changed in the past 227 years. The
division lived under the “train as you fight” motto for the 12 months preceding the war.
The training proficiency, lethality, and maturity of the division serve as an example for
the Army to follow.
Lessons Learned
Key leader and soldier stabilization produced a mature fighting force.
Combined arms force on force and live fire exercises prepared units of all levels for
combat.
Command and control training under offensive conditions at task force through
division level was essential to the division's success.
Chapter 1
Continuous Offensive Operations Over Extended Distances
Topic B - Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and
Intelligence (C
4
I)
The division succeeded in its tenacious attack over 600 kilometers (km) from Kuwait to
Baghdad, through storms of biblical proportion and constant enemy resistance,
specifically because of its bold and decisive maneuver and the ability to command and
control on the move. Brigade combat team (BCT) and division command posts (CPs)
2
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separated and formed smaller more mobile command posts in preparation for the
continuous attack.
An example of these smaller CPs was the division's use of an assault command post
(ACP). Doctrinally the ACP is created to provide a jump capability to a tactical command
post (TAC). The ACP is a temporary organization that moves forward to allow for
continuity in command and control while the remainder of the CP begins to move
forward. The 3ID (M) did not follow this doctrine during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
The division's ACP was a permanent C
2
node that provided the commanding general
the flexibility to freely move on the battlefield with a separate security and
communications package. The ACP enabled the Division Commander to gain a different
view of the battlefield than the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) (ADC[(M])
and command the division from a vantage point of the commander’s choice.
BCT and division CPs became more mobile and responsive by adapting the level to
which they set up during stops. Most CPs had at least two levels of setup in order to
maximize capabilities for the duration of the halt.
These smaller and more mobile CPs had several enablers that greatly enhanced the
command and control of the division including: Force XXI battle command brigade and
below – Blue Force tracker (FBCB2 BFT), wide band tactical satellite (TACSAT), and
Iridium phones. Maneuver units enjoyed huge success commanding and controlling on
the move; however other battlefield operating systems (BOS) struggled with
onthemove capabilities, mainly centered on communications platforms. All future
development in the command and control (C
2
) arena must be focused on a mobile
structure with long haul communications for voice and data.
The Army must recognize the requirement for smaller and mobile CPs for future
doctrine. At the division and brigade level, rapid and decisive offensive maneuver over
extended distances cannot be executed without the ability to C
2
from multiple C
2
nodes
on the battlefield, each of which must be capable of executing C
2
of its subordinate
elements while it is on the move. To address this problem the division’s modification
tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) must be changed to provide additional
equipment and personnel to enable divisions and brigades to command and control on
the move.
The mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network is an antiquated system that must be
replaced as quickly as possible. As the division’s primary MTOE means of
communications over extended distances, its components must be stationary in order to
function. With such limitations, there is no way that this type of system can provide
reliable, responsive communications over the extended distances and at the extreme
pace of operations seen during the offensive operations of OIF. As long as any of the
subordinate elements is on the move, the echelon exercising C
2
must use onthemove
communications systems to do so. During the entire period from line of departure (LD)
to the 101st relief in place (RIP) at An Najaf (21 March through 29 March) and again
from continuation of offensive operations through seizure of the presidential palace in
Baghdad (31 March through 7 April), the division had at least one and frequently two or
three of its brigade size subordinate elements and most, if not all, of the division’s C
2
nodes completely on the move. The only way the division could exercise C
2
was by
using its onthemove communication systems. The MSE system is designed primarily
to provide services to stationary CPs in a Cold War style battlefield that is in a fixed
geographical area around the locations in which stationary MSE equipment is operated.
The name mobile subscriber equipment came from the ability to use mobile subscriber
radio telephones (MSRTs) within a 15 km radius of the locations in which stationary
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