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NEWSLET T ER
Jul 03
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Joint Readiness Training Center
National Training Center
Fires in the Close Fight
Vo l u m e I I
(Focused Rotation - Observations)
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350
No. 03-16
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350
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FOREWORD
This is the second newsletter of a twovolume set focused on improving the integration and
synchronization of fires in the close fight. For several years, the U.S. Army Infantry School, U.S.
Army Field Artillery School, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned have worked together to
identify weaknesses in synchronizing fires and maneuver at the Combat Training Centers. More
than just identifying issues, this product provides solutions in the form of tactics, techniques, and
procedures to help units improve performance in focusing fires for the close fight.
MICHAEL A. HIEMSTRA
COL, FA
Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned
FIRES IN THE CLOSE FIGHT II
Fires in the Close Fight: JRTC and NTC 2003, Volume II
Foreword
Chapter 1: Training
How to Develop the Best-Ever Fire Support System
1
Personnel Turbulence and Fires in the Close Fight: How Can We Fix It?
7
Chapter 2: Fire Support Planning
Maneuver Commander's Guidance for Fire Support -- What We Really Need
11
COLT Employment in Light Divisions
19
A Guide for the Aviation Battalion Fire Support Officer (FSO)
21
Mortars and Five Requirements for Accurate Fires
27
Chapter 3: Fires in the Close Fight
Improving the Responsiveness and Lethality of Fires at the BCTP Level
31
Attack Aviation Fires for the Close Fight: A New Approach
39
Fire Base Defense is a Red Leg Mission!
47
Bibliography
51
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
Center for Army Lessons Learned
Director
Colonel Michael A. Hiemstra
Managing Editor
Mr. George Mordica II
Project Analyst
Mr. Ralph Nichols
CTC Analyst (JRTC)
Mr. Thomas P. Odom
Editor, Layout, and Design
Valerie Tystad
Graphics and Cover
Catherine Elliott
The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this
periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by
law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been
approved by Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, IAW
AR 2530.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used,
both are intended.
LOCAL REPRODUCTION OF THIS NEWSLETTER IS
AUTHORIZED AND ENCOURAGED!
ii
FIRES IN THE CLOSE FIGHT II
CHAPTER 1 - TRAINING
How to Develop the Best-Ever Fire Support System
by Lieutenant Colonel James Miller
Previously published in
Field Artillery,
September-October 2002
Hammer Three Zero, this is COLT [combat observation lasing team] Three zero. BRT [brigade
reconnaissance troop] has identified 50 enemy vehicles moving north. Fire target group Hotel
Three Mike, “At My Command,” over.
Roger, Hotel Three Mike, “At My Command.” Sky Hammer reports CAS [close air support] is
on station; ACA [airspace coordination area] Mike is in effect.
COLT Three Zero, roger. Forward TACPs [tactical air control parties] already have eyes on the
enemy formation, vicinity Whale Gap.
COLT Three Zero, Hammer Three Zero. Steel is ready on Hotel Three Mike; 36 rockets in effect.
Roger, fire Hotel Three Mike; we are clearing the CAS in hot, time now….
COLT Three Zero, Hammer Three Zero. It has been 10 minutes—status over?
Hammer Three Zero, roger. End of mission. Hotel Three Mike CAS is off station; target
destroyed.
Request BDA [battle damage assessment], over.
Roger. There are too many dead vehicles to count right now—that’s going to take awhile and I
am little busy right now…besides, we got them all. Stand by to repeat on the second enemy
battalion….
Our Combat Training Centers(CTCs) repeatedly have reported on the shortcomings of our fire
support officers (FSOs) and their ability to provide close supporting fires for the maneuver
commander. As fire supporters, this is not what we want. The scenario is representative of the
occasional fire support success the Hammer 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3d Infantry
Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia, had at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort
Irwin, California, last summer. In this engagement, the brigade’s fire support system destroyed
51 vehicles in the enemy’s lead formation as it exited Whale Gap. More importantly, our success
was the result of a dedicated BCT effort to ensure we had a welltrained fire support system, one
capable of providing accurate, timely and deadly fire support to our maneuver forces.
How did we do it? Simply put, we decided we wanted it and put a determined effort into it. Of
key importance, that decision was made by and fully supported by the brigade commander. In
addition, the division artillery commander put the full weight of his support behind it as well.
The Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, provided additional support in the form of a fire
support focused rotation at the NTC.
Basically there are five reasons we were so successful: command emphasis, experience of our
fire support personnel, training, integration and our equipment.
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