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NEWSLETTER
APPL
Oct 06
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
No. 07-04
No. 07-04
Foreword
Media operations are vital components of the information operations fight. This newsletter
explores the role media operations play on the modern battlefield, enumerating battle-tested and
proven public affairs training guidance tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). These TTP
help units and Soldiers gain a better perspective and situational understanding of the battlefield
environment. Media operations provide units and Soldiers with an enhanced capability to view
the adversary and themselves through someone else’s viewpoint – via television, Internet, or
print media.
Steven Mains
Colonel, Armor
Director
Center for Army Lessons Learned
MEDIA IS THE BATTLEFIELD 2006 NEWSLETTER
Media is the Battlefield 2006 Newsletter
Table of Contents
Media is the Battlefield 2006: An Introduction,
Thomas P. Odom
1
Chapter 1: Producing Change in Army Public Affairs: Ideas for Refocusing
Operations,
LTC James E. Hutton
3
Chapter 2: Public Affairs Operations: Brigade Task Force Level,
MAJ Darryl Wright
17
Chapter 3: A Successful Brigade Public Affairs Officer,
LTC Randy A. Martin
29
Chapter 4: Arab Media Interviews and the American Commander,
LTC Randy A. Martin
33
Chapter 5: Media-on-the-Battlefield Training: How-To,
LTC Randy A. Martin
37
Chapter 6: Media on the Battlefield – “A Nonlethal Fire,”
CPT David Connolly
43
Chapter 7: Integration of Information Operations into Planning and
Operating, Public Affairs and the Media,
Extract from CALL Initial Impressions
Report (IIR) 05-3, Information Operations
51
Chapter 8: Support Operations, Public Affairs Office,
Extract from CALL IIR
06-11, Disaster Response Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
59
Appendix A: Public Affairs Guidance for Training Purposes
63
Appendix B: Task Force Iron Horse Guidelines for Working with News
Media in Iraq
71
Appendix C: Role Play Media Training Guidance
75
Appendix D: Plan a Media Visit
77
Appendix E: React to a Media Interview
81
For Official Use Only
i
CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
Director
COL Steven Mains
Managing Editor
George J. Mordica II
Project Analyst (JRTC)
Thomas P. Odom
CALL Analyst
Ralph D. Nichols
Production Manager
Valerie Tystad
Editor
John Pennington
Graphic Artist
Mark Osterholm
Labels and Distribution
Carrie Harrod
CALL has many products of interest. We invite you to visit our Web site at:
The intent of this CALL publication is to share knowledge, support discussion, and impart
lessons and information in an expeditious manner. This CALL publication is not a doctrinal
product. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) observed and reported in this publication
are written by Soldiers for Soldiers. Please send relevant TTP to Mr. George J. Mordica II,
Managing Editor (COM: 913-684-9503/ DSN: 552-9503, FAX: DSN 552-9583, email:
mordicag@leavenworth.army.mil.) Articles must be submitted in Microsoft Word format.
Graphs, slides, and photos must be submitted separately in their original form in either TFF, PSD
(Adobe Photoshop), or high-resolution JPEG format.
The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in
the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for
printing this publication has been approved by Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command, 1985, IAW AR 25-30.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.
Note: Any publications referenced in this newsletter (other than the CALL newsletters), such as
ARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.
This information was deemed of immediate value to forces engaged in the Global War
on Terrorism and should not necessarily be construed as approved Army policy or
doctrine.
This information is furnished with the understanding that it is to be used for defense
purposes only; that it is to be afforded essentially the same degree of security protection
as such information is afforded by the United States; that it is not to be revealed to
another country or international organization without the written consent of the Center
for Army Lessons Learned.
ii
For Official Use Only
MEDIA IS THE BATTLEFIELD 2006 NEWSLETTER
Media is the Battlefield 2006: An Introduction
Thomas P. Odom, Civilian Military Analyst,
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Observation Detachment
In 1992, a select group of officers, led by then BG Robert Scales as the Desert Storm Study
Group, was charged by the U.S. Army Chief of Staff to write the Army’s story on Operations
Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Provide Comfort. The result was the book,
Certain Victory:
The U.S. Army in the Gulf War.
One of the greatest challenges in writing the book was finding
photographs from any source on U.S. Army ground operations in the conflict. It was the day of
the tightly controlled media pool, a method that virtually excluded media access to the battlefield
once the war, particularly ground operations, commenced.
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter 92-7,
In the Spotlight Media and the
Tactical Commander
, captured many of the insights and lessons learned relating to media and
media relations in that war. For the most part, media relations and public affairs (PA) were
viewed as an adjunct to operations. Developing and sustaining a positive media atmosphere were
viewed as a combat multiplier for existing battlefield operating systems (currently referred to as
warfighting functions).
As the end of the 1990s approached, U.S. Army involvement in operations in the Balkans grew.
Interest in media operations as part of information operations (IO) and as a stand-alone subject
grew accordingly. Media relations and PA came to be seen as a warfighting tool to support
decisive operations. CALL published Newsletters 99-2,
Information Operations: IO in a Peace
Enforcement Environment
; 99-15,
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Information
Operations
; and 03-18,
Task Force Eagle Information Operations
(a follow-up to CALL
Newsletter 99-15). The media approach taken in 1990 and 1992 proved to be inadequate for PA
operations in the new millennium.
MAJ James E. Hutton, as Chief of Media for U.S. Transportation Command, wrote a
thought-provoking article for CALL titled, “Producing Change in Army Public Affairs: Ideas for
Refocusing Operations” (
News from the Front,
September-October 2001). MAJ Hutton’s article
serves as Chapter 1 of this 2006 newsletter. Much of what MAJ Hutton called for was soon to
happen, accelerated by the events of 9/11.
With the collapse of the World Trade Center towers and the simultaneous strike on the Pentagon,
both seen virtually live around the globe, media relations and PA became the fourth dimension
of modern warfare as practiced in the 21st century. Rather than a combat multiplier for lethal
warfighting functions, PA, especially as a component of IO, became integral to decisive
operations. It was no longer a question of considering the media’s role on the battlefield. More
properly stated, the media had become part of the battlefield. MAJ Hutton’s 2001 article
heralded that change.
Certainly the JRTC was well aware of the changes MAJ Hutton wrote about; the JRTC was a
key training center for Balkans mission rehearsal exercises. In 2001, the U.S. Department of
Defense issued guidance emphasizing the need for timely and accurate media and command
information coverage of U.S. military operations (see Appendix A). Media-on-the-battlefield
training was something JRTC rotational units and leaders could expect (“dread” was a word
sometimes heard). Some of the changes MAJ Hutton called for are evidenced in “Public Affairs
Operations: Brigade Task Force Level” (Chapter 2), written by MAJ Darryl Wright, the JRTC
PA officer (PAO) observer/controller (OC). Writing in 2002, MAJ Wright drew heavily on the
methodology put forward in CALL Newsletter 02-3:
Targeting the Rakkasan Way: A Complete
Guide on the Brigade-Level Targeting Process,
battle-tested that same year in Operation
Enduring Freedom.
For Official Use Only
1
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